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1 
COMMON IDEALS, DIVERGENT NATIONS 
Healing is a matter of time, but it is sometimes a matter of 
opportunity. 
HIPPOCRATES 
Washington, D.C. I'm attending a good-bye party for 
a friend who is leaving her job at a local museum, A friendly group 
has gathered at a fashionable northwest restaurant for drinks and hors 
d'oeuvres. I find myself face to face with an art historian from the National 
Portrait Gallery, I get the standard question, "What do you do?" I tell the 
interrogator that I'm writing a book on U.S. and French health care. "Oh 
really," he responds. "Theirs is government imposed, isn't it?" Another 
scene. Flagstaff, Arizona. A Halloween party for kids, mostly of faculty from 
Northern Arizona University. I'm talking with a biologist. She asks about 
my research. I say it's on health care in France. 1 pause for the reaction, 
to which by now I've become accustomed. She replies, as if on cue, "You 
mean socialized medicine?" Back in Washington, at the Brookings Institu-
tion, a public policy research institute. It's intermission at a conference on 
transatlantic relations. I've just met a French businesswoman; she's curious 
about my work, so I recount the two scenes above. "Socialized medicine!" 
she exclaims in English, "Thats the British!" 
Americans often assume that all European health care systems are alike, 
something called "socialized medicine," under which the government, 
for good or ill, runs everything. Most do not understand that there are 
major differences among European countries in how they pay for and de-
liver medical care. More to the point, because European health care sys-
tems are dubbed—and dismissed as—"socialized medicine" Americans do 
not understand that they can learn much from how different health care 
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systems address and resolve problems of cost, efficiency, and access. This 
is particularly important today as Americans consider how to cope with 
a health care crisis that often appears intractable. 
By analyzing the historical development of the contemporary French 
and U.S. health care systems, I hope to advance this understanding, so that 
those concerned with health care policy in both countries—and ordinary 
citizens whose lives depend on the health care system—can avoid the 
pitfalls described by the historian Marc Bloch in his classic appeal on be-
half of comparative history nearly a century ago. Bloch argued against the 
tendency to limit histories to one region or another. Historical research un-
doubtedly requires language expertise and in-depth knowledge of the society 
under scrutiny Historians' specialization along regional and national lines 
has made possible enormous progress in understanding peoples and places 
on their own terms, free from any imperative to relate their past—or 
present—to some "other." 
Yet with this practice of writing place-bound histories comes a certain 
danger. Authors quite naturally seek the causes and effects of the change 
they wish to describe within those boundaries. Much of the time they are 
justified in doing so. But in some cases, more general factors, which might 
be shared by more than one society or nation, go unnoticed. That is why 
Bloch advocated such a grand place for comparative history. Only through 
it, he believed, can we observe resemblances and differences across di-
verse lands and thereby perceive larger dimensions of the past that would 
otherwise remain unperceived, or worse, misperceived.1 
In this book 1 present a comparative history of health care in the United 
States and France, from the early years of the twentieth century to the pres-
ent day I examine employers, labor unions, political groups, insurers, the 
state, and medical professionals to reveal their various influences on the 
French and U.S. health care systems and on the pursuit of health security 
by the citizenry of each nation. I consider not only what Americans have 
to leam from France but what the French have to learn from the U.S. ex-
ample. Indeed, some of those on the U.S. side of the Atlantic who advocate 
a switch from the "french fry" to the "freedom fry" might be surprised to 
know how many values the two nations share and how much they are 
borrowing from one another. For example, the United States, quite by ac-
cident and with virtually no comprehensive planning or debate, is headed 
toward a public-private mix of health care financing that is far more French 
than most Americans realize. As a result, a better understanding of Frances 
public-private health care system, its management, historical origins, and 
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present challenges would be constructive in the U.S. search for health care 
solutions. The French, meanwhile, are busily adapting U.S. managed care 
techniques and hospital payment methods to their public and private health 
insurance. What more can these two countries learn and adapt (or adopt) 
from each other as they struggle with their respective health care crises? 
What the French and U.S. health care systems share, as well as what 
divides them, is reflected in the various interpretations of their eighteenth-
century revolutions. Both the American and French revolutionaries hailed 
the Enlightenment ideals of individual rights and popular sovereignty, 
leading to an inherent tension between personal liberty and social equal-
ity in the republics they formed.2 This tension has been evident in virtually 
all health care reform initiatives since the First World War (1914-1918), 
which sought to compel citizens to participate in health insurance. Such 
debates have recurred on five occasions in the United States and twice in 
France. In each of these instances, a central question was whether indi-
vidual liberty should be sacrificed for the sake of collective equality and 
the common good. In both countries, the debates exhibited nuanced argu-
ments that sought to reconcile liberty and equality. Proponents argued that 
to compel a sacrifice on the part of the individual in the form of a small 
tax, would, in fact, free him or her from fear of medical indigence. The net 
outcome, they argued, was more liberty, not less. Meanwhile, opponents of 
compulsory health insurance consistently promoted voluntary measures, 
which made a powerful appeal to individual liberty, personal responsibility, 
and worker autonomy 
These questions remain at the heart of contemporary health care 
debates m both nations. How should one interpret the terms "liberty" and 
"equality" today? Does libeny require that health care be free from gov-
ernment intervention? Does equality entail equal access to medical care 
without regard for ability to pay? Or does it mean that insurers must take 
all comers? Should health care be linked to employment, as it is in both 
countries? How has this link constructed our views of the "deserving" and 
"less deserving" sick? How does one address the financial and professional 
concerns of vital health care actors, especially physicians? The tension 
between liberty and equality has been characterized in different ways over 
the course of the twentieth century: as personal responsibility versus social 
welfare, private enterprise versus communism, voluntarism versus com-
pulsion, and individualism versus interdependent citizenship, to name 
a few. Just below the surface of all these designations lay fundamental 
tensions that were inescapable, given the founding ideals of both nations. 
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How History Helps Us Think obout Contemporary 
Health Care Challenges 
Too often, health care studies, as informative as they are, offer only 
a snapshot, a single frame of what is inevitably a very long movie, whose 
directors, producers, and actors change the plot and the script in the 
course of the show. Relatively few policy studies deal in any depth with 
what are fundamentally historical causes and questions. 
To begin with, U.S. and French health care was strikingly similar 
a hundred years ago. How and why did the two systems diverge so dramati-
cally by century's end? And what about the similarities that remain, namely, 
the shared attachment to workplace health security; ideals of patient choice 
and private practitioners; and a common distrust of "socialized medicine"? 
This shared distrust has helped to conceal—certainly in the case of the 
United States—the fact that in all industrialized societies, health care has 
been socialized to a greater or lesser degree for a long time, and fortunately 
so. Few seriously ill patients or accident victims could pay the actual costs 
of the medical and hospital services they receive. Treatment for an auto ac-
cident can easily run into the tens of thousands of dollars. Depending on 
the model, a pacemaker, with installation costs, can come to over a hun-
dred thousand dollars. Even fewer of us could afford the long-term nursing 
and valiant end-of-life care that has become common in the United States 
and Europe. In fact, 80 percent of health spending in the United States 
goes to care for just 20 percent of the population. It is roughly the same in 
France. Ten percent of its citizenry account for 60 percent of health care 
expenditures. If you are an average American or French reader, you will 
incur at least half of your lifelong medical expenses during your last six 
months of life. The burdensome cost of twenty-first-century health care 
simply has to be spread over large groups. What remains undecided is how 
best to do it.3 
This is why, over the course of the twentieth century, countries 
developed two basic ways of socializing the cost of medical care to create 
health security for their citizenry. Great Britain possesses the archetypal 
Health service, under which funding for most medical care facilities and the 
remuneration of doctors and other medical personnel flow more or less 
directly from the government treasury In contrast, France and the United 
States rely heavily on health insurance, wherein medical facilities and health 
professionals are in both the public and private sectors, and their funding 
flows from public insurance funds and from private insurers,4 France has 
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large public health insurers, complemented by many private insurers. The 
United States presents a mirror image of this system. It relies heavily on 
large private insurers, which are supplemented by public health insurers 
such as Medicare. Throughout the twentieth century, France undertook 
successive reforms that encouraged physicians to remain in private practice, 
which doctors and patients alike believed was necessary to ensure ethical, 
quality care. Indeed, in France, discussion of a service de same (a health 
service such as Britain's) elicits popular scorn in the same way that the term 
"socialized medicine" does in the United States. It is commonly viewed as 
antithetical to the nation's values. 
In the United States, the term "socialized medicine" gained currency 
when opponents of President Harry Truman's national health insurance 
initiative in the late 1940s used it to characterize his program. As an epithet, 
it proved extremely effective because it bound together two emotionally 
charged concerns. First, it called to mind the United States' cold war with 
the Soviet Union and thereby tarred national health insurance as un-
Amencan and its backers as traitors. The president of the American Medi-
cal Association used to refer to proponents of national health insurance as 
having "a pinkish pigmentation," common parlance at the time for Com-
munist sympathizers.5 At the same time, "socialized medicine" invoked fear 
of impersonal, assembly-line medical care. Patients would not be able to 
choose their own doctor; medical personnel would owe allegiance not to 
the patient but to an anonymous and distant bureaucracy, which would 
require reams of paperwork and preauthorizations. Of course, as congres-
sional testimony on the "Patient's Bill of Eights" aimed at health mainte-
nance organizations (HMOs) in the 1990s demonstrated, impersonal 
treatment of patients can result from private medical bureaucracies just 
as well as from government ones. Yet that debate simply provides more 
evidence that Americans, like the French, possess strongly held beliefs 
about how patients should be treated and the limitations that reformers, 
whether public officials or private CEOs, face if they want to stem the rapidly 
rising cost of health care. 
The United States and France share the distinction of possessing two of 
the world's most expensive health care systems. The U.S. system is far and 
away the more costly, gobbling up just over 15 percent of the gross domes-
tic product (GDP), or $5,711, annually for every man, woman, and child in 
2003, By 2014, the share of U.S. national income devoted to health care is 
expected to grow by nearly 25 percent, to 18.7 percent of the GDP. Mean-
while, the French have the fifth most costly health care system, spending 
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almost 10.5 percent of their GDP, or $3,048, per capita in 2003. That share 
is also expected to rise, but not as quickly as in the United States. In both 
countries, health care price increases run at rates well above general infla-
tion, driven by a host of factors, notably an unquenchable demand for 
increasingly effective (and expensive) diagnostic techniques and pharma-
ceuticals, and high salaries for expertly trained medical specialists. Both 
nations also have aging populations, which require on average far more 
hospital and medical services than younger groups.6 
Though when all is said and done, the French get a lot more for a lot 
less money. In 2001, the World Health Organization (WHO) named French 
health care the best in the world. The United States ranked thirty-seventh 
in the same survey. For health policy experts in Paris and Washington, the 
WHO report did not come as a great surprise. France shone because of 
its universal insurance coverage, responsive health care providers, patient 
and practitioner freedoms, and the impressive health and longevity of its 
citizens. Although the United States scored at the top in some categories, 
such as provider responsiveness, its overall score suffered because of the 
astronomical cost of U.S. health care, its well-known problems for those 
without insurance (fully 15.9 percent of the population, or 46.6 million 
individuals in 2005), and the inequities in care depending on one's 
race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status. One would have to return to 
the France of the 1960s to find the same levels of the uninsured and the 
shamefully poor access to medical care. Ninety-nine percent of the French 
population had obtained health insurance by 1980, either through public 
or private insurers, as a dependent of an insured person or through special 
funds for the unemployed. A 2000 law extended coverage to the remaining 
1 percent that had somehow fallen through the cracks.7 Public opinion in 
the United States and Europe reflects the high marks the WHO report gave 
to France. 
A 2004 Harris poll of Europe's five largest nations found that the French 
are by far the most satisfied with their health care system (65 percent). By 
contrast, only 32 percent of Britons viewed their National Health Service 
in a positive light; the Germans panned their country's health care, with 
only 28 percent happy about its performance. When the same European 
respondents were asked which country's health care system they most ad-
mired, France again topped the list. Few Europeans in the survey felt posi-
tively about U.S. health care (10 percent), thereby agreeing with Americans 
themselves. A 2003 Kaiser Family Foundation poll found that 56 percent 
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of Americans believed that their health care system needed major reform, 
while 30 percent expressed the view that it was beyond repair and should 
be completely rebuilt.8 
While both nations face rapidly rising health care bills, price increases 
in the United States have been pushed further skyward by relatively high 
payroll expenses for nonmedical personnel, which includes underwriters, 
marketing specialists, insurance billers, and customer service agents. They 
Table 1. American and French Demographic, Economic, and Health Indicators 
Indicator France United States 
Demography mid Economics 
Total population (2004) 
Population over 65 (2004) 
GDP per capita (purchasing power parity) (2004) 
GDP growth average (1994-2004) 
Unemployment rate (2004) 
Personal income tax of total receipts (2002) 
Taxes on goods and services of total receipts (2002) 
Average production workers disposable income 
of gross pay (2002) 
Health Cart System 
Health care spending of GDP (2003) 
Health care spending per capita (purchasing 
power parity) (2003) 
Public portion of total health care spending (2003) 
Practicing physicians per 1,000 residents (2004) 
Physician consultations per capita (2003) 
Acute care bed days per capita (2004) 
Acute care beds per 1,000 residents 
MRI scanner units per million residents (2004) 
Health Status oj'Population 
Life expectancy at birth in years (2003) 
Female life expectancy at 65 in years (2002) 
Male life expectancy at 65 in years (2002) 
Infant mortality per 1,000 live births (2003) 
Tobacco consumption (percentage of population 
15 years or older smoking daily) (2002) 
Obese as percentage of population (body mass 
index > 30 kg mJ) (2002) 
60,200,000 
16.3% 
£29,600 
2.3% 
10.1% 
17.3% 
25.4% 
73.2% 
10.4% 
$3,048 
78.3% 
3.4 
6.7 
1.0 
3.8 
3.2 
79.4 
21.4 
17,1 
4.0 
26.0% 
9.4% 
293,655.000 
12.4% 
$39,700 
3.3% 
5.5% 
37.7% 
17.6% 
75.7% 
15.2% 
$5,711 
44.6% 
2.4 
3 9 
0.7 
2.8 
5.0 
77.5 
19.5 
16.6 
6.9 
18.4% 
30.6% 
Source' Compiled from QECD in Figures 2005; Statistics on Member Countries (Paris: OECD, 2005), 
6-16, 38, and OECD Health Data 2006 (Paris; OECD, 2006). Statistics for U.S. MR] units probably 
understate actual number since only the number of facilities with at least one unit is reported. 
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have become fixtures in the U.S. health care bureaucracy at health insur-
ance companies, hospitals, clinics, and doctors' offices throughout the 
country. Meanwhile, analysts inside and outside France have observed that, 
far from conforming to stereotypes of a bloated government bureaucracy 
French public health insurance, Seatrite Sociale, is probably understaffed.9 
Like Medicare and Medicaid in the United States, its administrative costs 
are well below those of private insurance companies (6 percent versus 
13 percent).10 The predominant role of Securite Sociale in French health 
care translates into a relatively high level of administrative efficiency 
compared with the United States. For example, instead of the labyrinth of 
deductibles, co-payments, and networks of medical care providers in the 
United States, a French patient presents a single mi croc hip-enhanced Secu-
rite Sociale card at her physician's office. The card permits a physician online 
access to a comprehensive medical chart. It also implements an almost im-
mediate electronic funds payment from Securite Sociale to the patient's bank 
account, reimbursing her for the appropriate portion of any fees associated 
with the doctor's visit. In addition to dealing with myriad health insurers, 
U.S. physicians have also faced large increases in their medical malpractice 
insurance premiums, as much as 30 percent in some states in 2004. French 
doctors have been spared these rising costs because the country's legal system 
is far more adverse to tort claims than its U.S. counterpart. 
No matter what the reason for the rapid rise in health care expenditures, 
U.S. or French political leaders who talk of initiatives that threaten patient 
liberties or doctors' clinical freedoms do so at their peril. Like Americans, 
the French have never accepted and likely never will accept waiting lists 
for medical procedures, as Britons and Canadians do. "Rationing" is not 
a word on the lips of U.S. or French politicians, at least not among those 
who wish to enlist support for health care reform.11 In 1995, when France's 
prime minister mentioned rationing care, if only to deny that his proposal 
included it, he suffered a devastating political defeat, as physicians rallied 
their patients to oppose him. That said, no matter what kind of system is 
used to allocate care, medical service providers inevitably respond, to a 
greater or lesser degree, to the financial incentives before them. Any financial 
incentive can bode ill or well for patient care and must be accompanied 
by ethical and legal safeguards. The fact remains, then, that in both the 
United States and France health care is rationed in myriad ways, based on 
ability to pay, statutory guidelines, administrative fiat, customary treatment 
regimens, and scientific practice norms, to name just the most common 
factors.12 This being the case, it is clear that the aversion to "rationing" 
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and "socialized medicine" in France and the United States is driven not by 
reason but by history, which it is critical to understand if we are to meet 
present-day challenges. 
The Role of the Slate and the Workplace 
It is difficult to imagine an institution more historically embedded 
in a nations politics, economy, and culture than health care. For many 
social scientists, health care epitomizes a "path-dependent" creation. That 
is to say, at virtually every step of its development, specific conditions 
and events exerted formative influences that in turn induced others. As 
each critical historical juncture passed, its outcome influenced subsequent 
changes, making some results more likely than others.11 The political sci-
entist Margaret Levi has aptly compared such a process to climbing an old 
tree. The climber inevitably makes choices about which branch system to 
follow, and even though "ii is possible to turn around or to clamber from 
one to another—and essential if the chosen branch dies—the branch on 
which a climber begins is the one she tends to follow."14 This metaphor for 
how a nation's health care system evolves tells us that history matters, that 
singular historical moments can possess tremendous explanatory power, 
and that radical reversals may be hard to achieve.15 But that does not mean 
that, because historical events on each side of the Atlantic are unique, the 
French and the Americans cannot learn how to solve their most nettlesome 
social problems from each other. 
The French historian Alexis de Tocqueviile understood this implicitly. 
He traveled widely in the United States during the 1830s, attempting to 
grasp the habits and institutions of the new nation in order to further his 
own understanding of France, especially its tribulations balancing liberty 
and equality. "In America," observed de Tocqueviile, "free morals have 
made free political institutions; in France, it is for free political institutions 
to mould morals."16 In this reflection, we see France's greater reliance on 
the republican state as an active agent in the quest for liberty and equality, 
After all, the French revolutionaries of 1789 faced a society far more rife 
with aristocratic privilege than the American colonies. In the revolution's 
most radical phase, under France's First Republic, its leaders tried and 
executed the king and queen, distributed the lands of the nobility and 
of the church to the peasantry; and banned slavery in France's colonies. 
These acrions surely reflected the newly installed revolutionaries' willing-
ness to use the state power that had once belonged to France's absolute 
monarchs, but they also showed a commitment to equality that American 
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revolutionaries could only contemplate. Most notably, the founders of the 
United States refused to grant equality to nearly a million of their country-
men and -women who had been forcibly brought to the States as slaves.17 
De Tocqueville's remark also belies the influence of the eighteenth-
century political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau on French republi-
canism. Next to inalienable individual rights, which are foundational to 
the republics of France and of the United States, Rousseau posited the exis-
tence of a general will, a sort of infallible common good to which all citizens 
should (and must) submit.18 But if the French republican state, even to the 
present day, can more easily intervene in the social and economic affairs of 
the nation, this does not mean there is no pluralism or protest in Frances 
politics. On the contrary As anyone who has witnessed French workers or 
students on strike will attest, those in the street can just as easily claim to 
possess the general will as those who occupy the government ministries. 
Indeed, France has experienced a fractious historical struggle over how to 
pay for and deliver health care, one that is just as contentious as that in 
the United States. By the same token, both countries have divided sharply 
over the states power of compulsion. That explains why early in the twen-
tieth century Americans and the French turned to nonprofit, independent 
associations that offered health security in the workplace. 
In both nations, political leaders rightly surmised that highly centralized 
government-directed health care would be unpopular. Instead, they advo-
cated a leading role for civil society organizations, considering them the 
best suited to reconcile liberty and equality in the pursuit of health. In 
France, these organizations were known as mutual aid societies, which 
long served as private health insurance clubs for stably employed men, 
usually through their workplace or professional association. 
In 1930, French legislators empowered mutual societies to serve as 
insurance carriers under the country's first compulsory health insurance law. 
The lawmakers' decision was a compromise. They hoped to make compul-
sory health insurance fit with France's longstanding tradition of voluntary, 
private approaches to health security. At about the same time, U.S. work-
ers and employers were embracing Blue Cross, voluntary, nonprofit plans 
for group prepayment of hospital care, a model that was soon adapted for 
physician services under the name "Blue Shield." By the outbreak of the 
Second World War, employers and workers in both nations were sharing 
the risk of illness on an unprecedented scale by using nonprofit, nongov-
ernment actors as intermediaries. In so doing, they preserved the traditional 
practices associated with private health insurance. Yet employment-based 
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health security in both the United States and in France had unfortunate 
side effects where equality was concerned. 
As some workers gained access to workplace health insurance, which 
they received in exchange for lower cash wages, they saw themselves (and 
were viewed by others) as responsible citizens who "deserved" any medical 
care they might need in the event of unexpected illness or accident. The 
"deserving" citizen was celebrated for his work and rewarded with health 
security. As defensible as this ethic may sound, its ugly underside was the 
belief that many citizens who, through no fault of their own, lacked access 
to workplace health insurance were "less deserving" of health security. Their 
only option was charity care, which did not come with the same guarantees 
of quality and patient choice that "deserving" citizens enjoyed. This develop-
ment had a particularly negative impact on women and minorities, who were 
(and are) much more likely to be considered "less deserving,"19 
In both France and the United States, comprehensive health insurance— 
whether compulsory or voluntary— first became prevalent among indus-
trial workers. Industry was a man's world where women were recognized 
only as adjuncts to the male worker's productive capacity. Most women 
worked at home and in nonmanufacturing jobs and could therefore gain 
insurance benefits only by virtue of their status as dependents. Employment-
based health insurance thus served to reinforce decidedly unequal con-
ceptions of gender and limited women's social mobility. Grouped with 
children as dependents of the male breadwinner, women were denied the 
dignity and liberties men enjoyed to pursue educational and employment 
opportunities. 
In the United States, the industrial origins of health insurance affected 
agricultural workers in a similar manner and creaied disparities of health 
care access along racial and ethnic lines. By the late 1950s, most white 
unionized industrial workers in the northern and midwestem manufactur-
ing centers had won generous health benefits at the collective bargaining 
table. Meanwhile, a disproportionate share of African American agricul-
tural workers in the South, and,of Latino farmworkers in the Southwest 
and California, lacked the economic and political power to obtain similar 
protections against illness and accidents,20 
The notion of "deserving" and "less deserving" citizens persists in 
the United States and, despite the universality of Secuiite Sociale, even 
in France. In recent years, more and more middle- and upper-income 
French people have grown reliant on France's booming private supple-
mental insurance industry; these policies cover most of the difference 
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between public insurance reimbursement and actual physician fees. Yet 
nearly 15 percent of the population lacks such coinsurance, meaning 
higher out-of-pockets costs for many who can ill afford it.21 In fact, a 
recent study that controlled for socioeconomic, demographic, and health 
status factors found that French adults with supplemental insurance are 
86 percent more likely to seek medical care than those without such cov-
erage. This disparity nearly matches that found between the likelihood 
of insured and uninsured adult Americans seeking care, even though the 
financial burden of treatment for uninsured Americans is far greater than 
that for those who lack supplemental coverage in France.22 
But nowhere is the distinction between "deserving" and "less deserving" 
citizens more apparent than in the U.S. health care program for the poor, 
Medicaid. Because Medicaid generally reimburses medical providers at 
lower rates than private insurers or Medicare, many clinics and physicians 
simply will not accept Medicaid patients. It appears to be a straightforward 
business decision, and physicians often justify it on those grounds. In a 
country with falling rates of private health coverage, however, Medicaids 
inability to attract medical care providers exacerbates discrepancies in U.S. 
health care availability and quality A 2005 study that measured quality 
and access to a set of core health services found that, a startling 85 percent 
of the time, poor people receive medical care of substantially lower quality 
than their higher-income compatriots. And that trend has worsened rather 
than improved in recent years.23 Yet although low socioeconomic status has 
become the best predictor of an individual's quality of care, middle-income 
Americans still suffer serious consequences because of the nations reliance 
on the workplace for health security 
Take the case of the San Diego physical therapist Amy D. Before 
September 2004 neither Amy nor her husband, Chris, would have viewed 
their family as vulnerable to health care insecurity. Amy, the daughter of a 
physician and sister of a surgeon, knew a great deal about health coverage 
through her family and her medical practice. She had been employed at the 
same clinic for six years; Chris worked for a small engineering firm through 
which they purchased comprehensive health insurance for themselves and 
their two children. In August 2004, however, Chris was laid off, leaving 
the family with two months to arrange new insurance. The following week, 
Amy was diagnosed with invasive breast cancer. 
Because Chris's firm employed fewer than twenty employees (like 87 
percent of all businesses, covering 19 percent of the U.S. labor force), the 
family could not take advantage of a federal law, known as COBRA, to buy 
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continued group health coverage through Chris's workplace, even if he 
had been willing to pay both the employer and employee portions of the 
premium.24 Meanwhile, Amy faced immediate surgeries and chemotherapy. 
She took a leave from her job on California state disability, which permitted 
her to purchase health insurance for herself through the clinic's Aetna group 
policy at six hundred dollars per month. Yet with Chris unemployed and 
Amy's disability stipend well below her usual income, the family could not 
afford the several hundred dollars more that would have been necessary to 
cover the entire family. Their home mortgage and mounting out-of-pocket 
coinsurance payments for Amy's treatment were just too high. Instead, they 
purchased catastrophic coverage for Chris and the children, which left Chris 
to seek care for his high blood pressure out of his own pocket. Yet this pru-
dence only led to further health insecurity. When Chris landed a new job, 
his new employer's group policy excluded any coverage for illness related to 
his high blood pressure for one year, simply because he had wisely sought 
treatment for it. 
Meanwhile, Amy's oncologist had placed her on Hercepton, an expensive 
(five thousand dollars per month) but highly effective treatment for some 
breast cancers. The regimen appeared to be working and Aetna was pay-
ing for most of it. But Chris's new employer group plan did not include 
Amy's oncologist in its provider network. Nor would the plan extend any 
dependent coverage at all if the employee's spouse could purchase coverage 
through her or his own workplace. Hence, because of Chris's newr employ-
ment, which should have been cause for celebration, Amy had to quit a 
job she loved to gain affordable health coverage for the family. Even then, 
continuity-of-care imperatives for a life-threatening condition dictated that 
Amy remain with her original doctor, which she did, paying the 30 per-
cent out-of-network coinsurance for Hercepton (fifteen hundred dollars a 
month) out of the family budget. Thankfully, Amy is a cancer survivor. Yet 
that status means that both she and Chris must forever weigh their employ-
ment decisions based on health insurance, not necessarily professional skill 
or salary.25 
What happened to the D. family could not occur in France, because 
a series of reforms beginning in 1945 effectively severed the connection 
between an individuals employment status and health security The sick, 
injured, or unemployed need not qualify for poverty assistance to enjoy 
public health insurance benefits, as they must in the United Slates. Indeed, 
unlike in the United States, the sicker you become in France, the greater 
your health care benefits. Inpatient hospital care for grave illnesses, for 
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example, are covered 100 percent, while ambulatory care usually requires 
a steep coinsurance payment of 30 percent. 
Yet Frances past, when health security was dependent on employment, 
still exerts a powerful influence. Because of it, the French (like the Ameri-
cans) continue to pay for their health insurance—and therefore much of 
their health care system—through paycheck deductions. French employ-
ers and their employees together pay wage levies of 20 percent; employers 
contribute 13 percent and workers 7.26 Because of this reliance on payroll 
taxes, France is very different from Great Britain or Scandinavian countries 
such as Denmark, where diverse income and property taxes pay for 80 per-
cent of the public health care system.27 The French, even more than the 
Americans, possess a long enmity with income tax, and their government 
has relied on it only sparingly. In 2004, only 60 percent of all households 
were subject to income taxes, and even then the tax raises less than a fifth of 
government revenue, versus more than a third in the United States. France 
relies far more heavily on consumption taxes and payroll levies.28 
Simple comparisons between U.S. and French health insurance payroll 
levies are difficult because of the wide array of U.S. medical insurance plans 
whose premiums vary by firm size and the "risk class" of the employees, 
a development whose origins I will explore in depth. Suffice it to say for 
now that U.S. health insurance is not priced as a percentage of wages, as 
in France, but in accordance with the health experience of the group or 
individual being insured. A large employer, such as the state of Arizona, 
which splits the cost of a family Blue Cross-Blue Shield preferred provider 
organization (PPO) plan with employees, paid over fifteen thousand dol-
lars a year per enrollee in 2005. Hence, for a moderate-income earner (fifty 
thousand dollars annually), the cost of medical insurance relative to wages 
is significantly higher in the United States—30 percent, versus 20 percent 
in France—even for a large group purchaser like a state government. Simi-
lar Blue Cross-Blue Shield coverage for an employee who works for a small 
firm in San Francisco can easily reach forty thousand dollars a year, or 80 
percent of gross wages. To be sure, some U.S. employers pay more than 
others toward their workers' coverage, but virtually all insist that rising 
health insurance premiums inevitably reduce cash wages. Thus, it was bad 
news for U.S. employers and workers when premiums for employer-based 
health coverage rose on average 7.7 percent in 2006, twice as fast as workers' 
wages (3.8 percent).29 
In France, Securite Sociale health premiums flow into one of several 
public insurance funds—not the government treasury—and are jointly 
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administered by employer and union representatives. Along with the 
government, Sicurite Sociale negotiates national medical fee schedules with 
the leading physician associations and other medical practitioner groups. 
These conventions, as they are called, form the basis of physicians' remuner-
ation. Although close to a third of French physicians now charge fees above 
convention rates, their patients' reimbursement is tied to them.30 Thus, as in 
the United States, where private insurers and Medicare use fee schedules 
to determine payments to physicians, French doctors' fees are ultimately 
constrained by insurers' willingness to pay. 
Although a Frenchman or Frenchwoman's medical insurance no longer 
relies on a particular job , France's legacy of employment-based health 
security remains stubbornly evident in the joint administration of Securite 
Sociale by unions and employers. This arrangement has made health care 
reform extremely difficult, especially when the reform threatens the pres-
ent reliance on paycheck deductions. Employers and labor leaders alike 
know that if health insurance premiums are "fiscalized," transferred away 
from payroll levies to a generalized income tax, their claims to control Secu-
rite Sociale governing boards would surely dimmish, which could threaten 
their administrative prerogatives and generous worker benefits. This inertia 
in Frances Sicurite Sociale is not unlike employers' and unions' addiction 
in the United States to the tax deductibility of health insurance premi-
ums and policies, which are priced according to the policyholder's risk 
experience. These policies permit large employers and unions to purchase 
comprehensive health coverage at rates well below what small firms and 
individuals pay. 
Workplace Health Security: An Artifact of the 
Twentieth Century 
Workplace-related health security, whether through a direct link 
between employer and employee (as in the United States) or through p u b -
lic health insurance funds managed by labor and business leaders (as in 
France), are an artifact of the first half of the twentieth century. This arti-
fact now hampers the resolution of health care crises in both nations. The 
downside of workplace-linked health insurance, which was embraced by 
workers and employers before and during the Second World War, n o w 
far outweighs its original civil society and associational benefits. Most ob-
viously, there is a problem of equity. When one relies on wage levies to 
pay for health care, whole classes of income earners—those profiting from 
rents and investment dividends—make relatively small sacrifices yet still 
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enjoy the most technologically advanced health care systems in the world. 
Even more damaging is the stultifying effect of workplace-re la ted health 
security on employment freedom. 
France has suffered from persistent high unemployment, nearly 
10 percent, since the 1980s. At least some of this unemployment is caused 
by what economists call an "insider-outsider" problem.-11 "Insiders" are 
long-time employees with secure jobs; they enjoy good benehts, including 
Securite Sociale, as well as employer-provided supplemental health insur-
ance. "Outsiders" are the unemployed or those in insecure, temporary posi-
tions. "Outsiders" would like a shot at an "insider" job but are stymied, not 
because they lack the skills but because employers face such high compul-
sory nonwage costs, for example, Securite Sociale payroll taxes. Employers 
hire only when they are absolutely certain that the new employees addi-
tional productivity will translate into sufficiently higher and enduring firm 
revenues to justify the commitment. French employers also face far more 
cumbersome (and therefore costly) firing rules than their U.S. counterparts, 
rules that union leaders, who represent "insiders," are loathe to see weak-
ened.33 The end result, which is linked to France's payroll-financed health 
care, is that employers are reluctant to hire, leaving potentially productive 
workers in unemployment lines. 
Well aware of this drag on employment, the French government in 
recent years has created a series of waivers whereby employers are excused 
from Securite Sociale charges, but only for a limited period. While this tactic 
has spurred hiring, somewhat driving unemployment down, it has also 
turned a stratum of France's workforce into temporary contract employees 
who are often let go when their employer's waiver expires. To be sure, 
because of Securite Sociale these workers enjoy far better health security 
during their temporary jobs and spells of unemployment than Americans 
in similar circumstances. Indeed, Securite Sociale maintains special health 
insurance funds for the unemployed and for those in unstable or seasonal 
work. Yet the link between employment and Securite Sociale remains an ob-
stacle to more efficient labor markets and higher economic growth, which 
together constitute the most promising long-term solutions to France's high 
unemployment. 
The relatively unregulated labor markets in the United States have 
helped it achieve higher levels of employment than France. That said, the 
United States appears to be developing its own version of the "insider-
outsider" problem. As in the French case, this problem is closely tied to 
nonwage labor costs, but the U.S. version is even more directly caused 
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by the health care system. A growing body of evidence shows that the 
U.S. economy suffers from "job lock" as a result of rising health care costs 
and health insurance underwriting practices.33 Job lock occurs when a 
worker makes career decisions based on the imperative to maintain afford-
able medical insurance coverage or to avoid the exclusion of a preexisting 
condition for herself or for a family member. 
Studies indicate that employer-provided health insurance reduces job 
mobility anywhere from 25 to 45 percent in the U.S. economy.3* For econ-
omists, this is a frightening statistic, since the nation's economic health ul-
timately relies on an efficient match between workers' skills and their jobs. 
If a growing number of workers seek, first and foremost, not jobs where 
their skills pay them higher wages but jobs that provide them with good 
health insurance, then productivity and, eventually, economic growth and 
the U.S. standard of living will suffer. Most worrisome, this phenomenon is 
commonly observed at the cutting edge of economic innovation and entre-
preneurship. Workers who might be most productive if they were to start 
their own firms choose not to do so because the self-employed and small 
firms face the highest health insurance costs. Needless to say, someone with 
a preexisting condition often cannot buy health insurance at any price to 
cover the malady and is therefore far more likely to remain in his or her 
current job, however unproductive. 
Just as U.S. workers are limiting their own job choices in search of health 
security, employers too seek shelter from health care risks. This translates 
into employers' reluctance to take on full-time employees, instead favor-
ing temporary and part-time workers, who are often ineligible for health 
benefits. Temporary workers' share of the labor market is growing far faster 
than the labor market as a whole.35 Another response, which is not avail-
able to French employers, has been to screen workers for their potential 
health care costs to the company. In 2005, the nations largest employer, 
Wal-Mart, promulgated plans to "dissuade unhealthy people from com-
ing to work at Wal Mart."36 Yet the far more common response, also an 
impossibility in France, is to reduce or drop health coverage altogether, or 
to transfer a greater share of cost increases to employees. The proportion 
of Americans under the age of sixty-five who received insurance from their 
employers (or a family members employer) fell from 67.7 percent to 63.1 
percent between 2000 and 2004. Employers who offered health coverage 
fell from 69 to 60 percent between 2000 and 2005. 
Taken together, these developments explain much of the recent rise 
in the number of uninsured Americans. Although temporary workers and 
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employees at small firms have been most affected, "insiders" in the United 
States—those who work in solidly unionized industries or for large firms— 
have also suffered from steep rises in their health insurance premiums. 
Between 2000 and 2005, premiums rose 73 percent, towering over the 
cumulative inflation rate (14 percent) and wage growth (15 percent).37 
All this points to a tremendous irony. If current trends continue, 
Americans' historical attachment to employment-based private health 
insurance will lead inexorably to a publicly financed health care system. 
Workers who cannot find health security where it has traditionally been 
most available to them since the 1940s are already turning to Medicaid in 
unprecedented numbers, both during their working years and for nurs-
ing home care after they retire. Medicaid had more than 50 million ben-
eficiaries in 2004, making it a larger program than Medicare. Meanwhile, 
those who earn too much to qualify for Medicaid but too little to afford 
private insurance join the ranks of the uninsured, a group that will grow 
to 56 million nonelderly adults by 2013, up from 45 million in 2003.38 To 
be sure, the uninsured include young healthy adults who forgo coverage 
of their own volition. Yet whether by choice or not, when serious illness 
or accident strikes, the uninsured inevitably rely on some level of care at 
public expense, even as they themselves face financial rum. Add to this 
the nearly $600 billion cost of the new Medicare prescription drug benefit 
and total U.S. national health expenditures will shift from being primarily 
private to being mostly public by 2014.39 What is more, these calculations 
do not even include lost government revenue (a form of public subsidy) as a 
result of employers' and employees' health insurance tax deductions, valued 
at $188 billion in 2004, a number that has been growing at a 9.2 percent 
annual rate since 1998.40 
The legacy of workplace-linked health security must be recognized 
for what it is—a twentieth-century solution that is failing to solve twenty-
first-century health security problems. Because of its extraordinary cost, 
U.S. health care, like the French, has now passed from being primarily a 
private affair to a public-private endeavor. With this shift, the burdensome 
link between employment and health security has become all the more 
evident. 
Liberty, Equality, and Medicine 
Much of this book concerns the response of physicians to various 
health care challenges. During the twentieth century and into the pres-
ent, French and U.S. physicians have had a common political ideology, 
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espousing the medical profession's sovereignty over health care. Doctors' 
struggle to defend their clinical freedoms and medical decision making has 
long been aided by a shared U.S. and French attachment to private practice, 
under which doctors and other medical care providers are paid for each 
individual service. In its purest form, fee-for-service medicine—paiement a 
Vacte in French— permits patients to choose their own doctors and physi-
cians to set their own fees. Equally important, proponents of fee-for-service 
medicine historically protected the sanctity of the doctor-patient relation-
ship with almost religious fervor, especially against any encroachment by 
the state. 
Doctors' battles against government plans for compulsory health 
insurance were enormously important in shaping the health care systems 
of both nations, French physicians agreed to cooperate with compulsory 
health insurance plans for industrial workers only m 1930, when they ob-
tained valuable guarantees regarding their right to set fees, exercise clin-
ical freedoms, and allow a patient to choose the practitioner. Likewise, 
U.S. physicians, though fiercely opposed to Medicare m the early 1960s, 
ultimately obtained similar assurances that protected their clinical free-
doms vis-a-vis the state. What is often overlooked, however, is that private 
insurers—not the state—have historically posed the greater threat to physi-
cians' sovereignty over medical decision making and to a patients choice 
of health care provider. 
French mutual aid societies served as insurance carriers for compul-
sory health insurance in the 1930s, Much as U.S. managed care corpo-
rations would do in the 1980s and 1990s, mutual societies threw vast 
resources into building clinics and surgery centers, then staffed them 
with doctors whom they compensated through a combination of capita-
tion and salary.41 Patients who patronized these facilities enjoyed lower 
out-of-pocket costs, but their choice of physician was limited, and finan-
cial incentives that might have conflicted with their best interests were 
ever-present. By providing medical services in much the same way that 
managed care does today, mutual societies directly violated legal protec-
tions of French physicians' fee-for-service practice, leading to successful 
legislative, legal, and professional action against the offending societies 
and complicit doctors. 
At about the same time, the Amencan Medical Association (AMA) 
launched professional and legal attacks against group medical prac-
tices, such as Kaiser Health Plans, which accepted prepayment for ser-
vices and restricted a patient's choice to doctors in the plan. In these 
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battles, the AMA usually prevailed. But they lost the war. Lacking the 
legal protections of private-practice medicine that French doctors gained 
in successive compromises on national health insurance, U.S. physicians 
were overwhelmed in the 1990s by a coalition of employers and insurers 
who sought lower prices through managed care. A new generation of U.S. 
physicians was soon signing up with managed care corporations, which 
now monitor doctors' treatment regimens, doling out incentives and 
punishments, in ways that would have horrified their elders. 
Because of the continued upward spiral of health care costs in France, 
physicians there are under similar, if less heavy-handed, pressure to abide 
by clinical practice norms. Indeed, if U.S. health care is becoming more 
French in its reliance on public funds, France's Securite Sociale is behaving 
more and more like a U.S. managed care corporation. Recent reforms 
have made Securite Sociale increasingly assertive in its quest to curb hos-
pital stays, pare physicians' use of expensive diagnostic technologies, and 
mold their habits for prescribing drugs. In fact, the health policy scholar 
Victor Rodwin has labeled France's ongoing reforms "the birth of state-led 
managed care." With the introduction of computerized medical records, 
medical practice guidelines, and gatekeeping primary care physicians, 
Securite Sociale hopes to take what it deems the best from U.S. managed 
care but leave its more unpopular initiatives behind.42 The strategy has 
an appeal. Because nearly 99 percent of France's ambulatory care doctors 
contract with Securite Sociale, French patients will never face the maze of 
provider networks and exclusionary underwriting practices that hamper 
quality, access, and continuity of care in the United States. 
Nevertheless, though France's relatively centralized public insurance 
system appears a promising candidate for managed care techniques, there is 
a powerful cultural counterforce rooted in the nation's historical embrace of 
individualism. Not unfamiliar to Americans, it absolutely rejects the notion 
that any individual's medical treatment should be weighed against a theo-
retical allocation of scarce resources for the common good. Of course, such 
financial cost-benefit analyses lie at the heart of managed care's resource 
allocation efficiencies and cost control. The tremendous value placed orr 
the individual, combined with physicians' sovereignty over medical deci-
sion making, means that French health care reforms that rely on managed 
care techniques will continue to face difficult if not insurmountable ob-
stacles.43 What is clear is that in both nations, physicians' diagnostic, pre-
scriptive, and therapeutic liberties remain at odds with efforts to rationalize 
health care, control its costs, and spread its benefits. 
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Medical Practice Then and Now 
As a starting point, we should recognize that at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, medicine in France and the United States closely re-
sembled each other in both practice and ideals. Medical science had only 
recently begun to make good on its ambitious promises. In France, the 
discoveries of Louis Pasteur established the prestige of scientific medicine, 
setting it apart from popular and folk medicine for the treatment of infec-
tion and the promotion of public health. The German Robert Koch iden-
tified the tubercle bacillus, thereby demonstrating the power of medical 
science to isolate the cause of the era's most feared killer, tuberculosis. Also 
extremely important were improvements in anesthesia, which, by relieving 
pain, permitted surgeons—then a far less respected branch of practitioners 
than physicians—to perform what had been impossible procedures on the 
body's major organs. 
Yet the empirical and theoretical case for scientific medicine took de-
cades to advance. The late 1800s were not the late 1900s when discoveries 
and improved techniques could be quickly shared across the globe. Well 
into the twentieth century, folkways and patent medicines of dubious value 
held sway. What mattered most to people, then as now, were results. And 
since medical science could often do little better than the traditional treat-
ments, and often simply waited for the malady to run its course, the public 
had nowhere near the respect for doctors that they do today Physicians' 
socioeconomic status has always closely reflected the effectiveness of the 
medical science of their day; this relationship helps us understand physi-
cians' response to health care change. 
Had we been able to eavesdrop on a conversation between two typ-
ical general practice doctors, one American and one French, posted to 
the western front during the First World War, in 1917, their conversa-
tion would have attested to ideological and practical kinship. Reminiscing 
about their lives back home, the physicians would have found they had 
both been raised in petty bourgeois families and had been drawn to medi-
cine in hopes of earning a respectable but not lavish income. Their solo 
medical practices relied on tiresome travel between rural and working-class 
households struck by illness. Both doctors would have bemoaned miserly 
contracts, which, out of financial necessity, they had signed with mutual 
aid societies or fraternal lodges—contracts that bound them to treat the 
group's entire membership for a low fixed price. The two practitioners 
would have been equally upset with industrialists who resisted paying 
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them on a fee-for-service basis, wanting instead to make them mere em-
ployees in their growing enterprises. Their loudest exhortations, however, 
would have been reserved for their respective governments: both would 
have sworn to fight any further government meddling in medical care, now 
that workers' compensation laws had been fully implemented in France 
and American state governments were approving them at a Lively pace,4* 
This Franco-American camaraderie would have stood in stark contrast 
to the circumstances and ideals of doctors on the other side of the barbwire 
or to those of a British physician who happened to be standing nearby, 
Germany had created Europe's first compulsory health insurance for about 
4 million industrial workers in 1883, a move that drastically affected the 
relationship between doctors and their patients, and between doctors and 
the government. Indeed, if our U.S. and French doctors had been able to 
share editorials from their medical journals, they would have seen that in 
both nations medical leaders defined vinually all that was good and noble 
about medicine by contrasting it with anything and everything German. 
Likewise, British doctors had flocked to Britain's National Insurance Act, 
passed in 1911, which, though less constraining than German illness in-
surance, nonetheless put the country squarely on the side of government-
directed health care. 
Today, a comparable conversation between two typical primary care 
physicians in private practice—great-granddaughters, let us say, of our 
World War One comrades—would also attest to sociological and practical 
kinship. A typical physician in both nations is nearly as likely to be a woman 
as a man, and she is very likely to hail from a professional, upper-middle-
class family—a daughter of a doctor or lawyer, not a baker. As impor-
tant as these commonalities may be, the great-granddaughters would find 
many more differences in their practices than had their great-grandfathers. 
Virtually all the French physician's patients would be eligible for public 
health insurance, Securite Sociale, a circumstance shared by the U.S. doc-
tor only if she restricted her care to Medicare and Medicaid patients, not 
a common practice. The U.S. doctor's income would be much higher, just 
over five times the average U.S. wage, while the French doctor would earn 
only about twice the average earnings of her compatriots. As a primary 
care practitioner, however, the French doctor would have many more col-
leagues, about half of all doctors in France, and a relatively easy time flying 
solo in her own office. Primary care physicians constitute only about a third 
of U.S. doctors and, because of the almost overarching need to hire non-
medical personnel to handle the cumbersome and various insurance billing 
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procedures, solo medical practices are now far less common in the United 
States, Despite differences in their offices, both physicians would surely 
agree thai the radically higher incomes of specialists in both countries were 
out of proportion to their extra training. Primary care physicians work just 
as hard, ihey would insist, and entrance to medical school is fiercely com-
petitive in France and in the United States, regardless of whether one plans 
LO pursue a specialty. Finally, for all her envy of her U.S. colleague's higher 
income, the French doctor could take comfort that she paid only nominal 
malpractice insurance premiums and had never borrowed to pay medical 
school tuition. Like all French universities, medical schools are tuition free. 
If the U.S. practitioner recounted her travails with insurers and her oc-
casional practice of "defensive medicine" to guard herself againsi lawsuits, 
the French physician might conclude that doctoring in France may be less 
remunerative, but it is considerably more hassle-free.'3 
The patients these physicians admitted to hospitals would also be very 
different from their early-twentieth-century predecessors. At that time, 
aside from facilities for veterans, which have illustrious histories in both 
nations, hospitals were local institutions. Most were owned and operated 
by municipalities, religious groups, or nonprofit organizations whose mis-
sion included community service, for example, universities, which built 
teaching hospitals for their medical students. Publicly traded, for-profit 
hospital chains were unknown.46 
Today, France's hospital sector is dominated by community and univer-
sity hospital medical centers. Yet, as with ambulatory care, where private 
insurers round out public coverage, private hospitals (both for profit and 
nonprofit) offer care that complements inpatient services in the public sec-
tor. In fact, France possesses the largest private hospital sector in Europe, 
accounting for 36 percent of all beds for acute cases, a public-private mix 
that has not changed in the last fifteen years. Generally, the patients with 
the most serious and complex cases end up in public hospitals, with pri-
vate hospitals specializing in more routine obstetrics, elective and cardiac 
surgery, psychiatric care, and radiation therapy Ultimately, however, the 
choice of hospital is up to the patient, his or her Securiti Sociale coverage 
being the same in both the private and public sectors.4" 
Public community hospitals now account for only a quarter of hospitals 
in the United Slates. Moreover, in contrast to its French counterpart, the 
U.S. hospital sector has witnessed a vast transformation in its public-private 
mix in recent decades. Between 1985 and 1995, the number of public 
hospitals declined by 14 percent Of these, nearly two-thirds converted to 
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private ownership or management, while the remainder closed their doors 
entirely. Hence, once again, as in the case of public versus private health in-
surance, the United States and France present mirror images of each other 
in their emphasis on public versus private ownership or control. 
The phenomenon of U.S. hospital closures provides a poignant example 
of how and why comparative historical approaches to health care are vitally 
important. U.S. observers generally attribute the closures to a 1980s switch 
from cost-plus reimbursement (under which hospitals charged insurers 
their actual costs plus a margin) to a case-based system (whereby hospitals 
are paid according to the patient's diagnosis). The resulting incentives trans-
lated into shorter hospital stays and therefore a decline in the total number 
of beds, since longer patient stays cost the hospital more without increasing 
its revenues* Certainly there is something to this explanation. Yet France 
also adopted case-based hospital reimbursement in the 1980s. Indeed, it 
was the first country outside the United States to do so. But France has 
maintained its relatively high ratio of beds per capita—3.8 per thousand 
compared with 2.8 per thousand in the United States. And France contin-
ues to do so at lower costs. The answer to this paradox is best apprehended 
through a historical approach, wherein health care is viewed not just in 
technical terms but also as a nexus of culture, politics, and economics. 
The Pitfalls of Language 
A history of health care, especially a comparative one, faces several 
pitfalls. Language is perhaps the most treacherous. One cannot blithely 
assume that words possess a constant meaning over time and in different 
countries.49 To begin with, the same political term may have very different 
meanings on either side of the Atlantic, both historically and in contempo-
rary usage. Liberalism in France denotes political beliefs that most would 
identify with fiscal conservatives or libertarians in the United States: ad-
vocacy of markets, deregulation, private enterprise, and balanced govern-
ment budgets. Indeed, a private-practice physician who insists on billing 
and clinical freedoms in France is known as a "liberal doctor" (un meciecm 
literal); and the burgeoning private-practice medical sector is known col-
lectively as "liberal medicine" (la medecine liberate). For the sake of clarity in 
both interpretation and translation, I use functional terms in the pages that 
follow—for example, private-practice—that correspond with their practical 
signification in time and place. 
Another lexical difficulty in comparing U.S. and French institutions 
concerns Che state. The distinction between the United States' federal and 
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state governments is readily apparent. The term "French state" Q'Etat 
francais), however, often capitalized in French documents, includes a civil 
service whose power relative to the elected government is greater than its 
U.S. counterpart. To be sure, the federal bureaucracy is no pushover when 
a new U.S. president wishes to implement substantial change, nor can any 
governor in the country assume that her state bureaucracy will cooperate 
fully when directed to execute reform. 
Yet in Frances more unified political structure, bureaucrats, especially 
high officials, who usually devote their careers to public service, enjoy an 
autonomy and public trust not present in the United States. The found-
ing director of Securite Sociale, Pierre Laroque, is a preeminent example, 
Very few Americans could name the first director of a comparably popu-
lar domestic program, such as Social Security or Medicare. By contrast, in 
France, it is Laroque, not the prime minister who held the reins of gov-
ernment in 1945, who is widely known and celebrated as "the father" of 
Securite Sociale, Yet Laroque was never elected to any office. Indeed, in high 
state officials, as much as anywhere else in Paris, resides Rousseau's general 
will, that is, a public perception of the common good. Thus, more so than 
in the United States, when private interests look to the state to arbitrate 
a conflict, implement reform, or simply guarantee their rights, they are 
appealing as much to an elite administrative corps as to elected political 
leaders.50 
Next, we must address several terms related to health. A health care 
system today comprises the totality of activities, actors, and institutions 
devoted to the financing of efforts to prevent, treat, and cure illness or injury, 
By that definition, the U.S. and French health care systems touch almost 
every aspect of our societies—from employers to governments to schools 
to places of worship, not to mention health care providers, insurers, and 
patients. Yet health care system is certainly not a term that would have been 
understood by someone in 1900. At that time, the broadest comparable 
concept would have bttnpublic health, which encompassed the concepts of 
hygiene, living conditions, and medical facilities that were largely devoted 
to charity care.31 
In the same way, a hospital of 1900 had little in common with today's 
gleaming medical complexes, staffed as they are by highly trained special-
ists, equipped with sophisticated diagnostic tools, and filled with effective 
pharmaceuticals. Hospitals at the turn of the twentieth century were social 
prisons, hostels for the helplessly destitute, the chronically ill, the tuber-
cular, and the insane. For its residents, the hospital may have been better 
